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Reflections on Grace (Part One)1
 
 
 The first part of this study (the second and third parts are to appear in the next two 
issues of the ITQ) concentrates on a review of the interpretation of the doctrine of 
grace since the Reformation. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
This three-part study examines the doctrine of grace in the light of the main 
approaches to the subject that have emerged in Catholic theology over about the 
past thirty years. That discussion, however, must be seen against the background 
of the history of the topic since the Reformation, which is the subject of this first 
article. While the main focus will naturally be on theology, especially on 
Catholic theology, the wider context in which theology operates also has to be 
borne in mind. But it has to be borne in mind as the context, not as the text itself. 
That ‘text’ is constituted by reflection on the actual reality of grace. 
 
 According to the earliest Christian tradition, grace is God’s own life. It is, 
furthermore, as far as we are concerned, a gratuitous2 gift by means of which 
God offers human beings the possibility of passing from their status as 
1 This is the first part of an adapted and expanded translation of an article that first 
appeared in French in the Revue de l’Institut Catholique de Paris, 51, juillet/septembre 
1994, 57–92, under the title: ‘Les divers courants de la théologie de la grâce 
aujourd’hui’. The author thanks the journal’s editor, Michel Quesnel, for allowing the 
original version to be used in the preparation of the present study. 
2 Jaroslav Pelikan notes that, in his anti-Pelagian writings, St Augustine exploited the 
assonance between the Latin words ‘gratia’ and ‘gratis’ in order to emphasise the 
absolute gratuity of the gift of divine grace to human beings. Augustine had of course 
other, more substantial and pertinent grounds for accepting the gratuity of grace. See J. 
Pelikan, The Melody of Theology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 
107. 
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ambiguous creatures, caught between joy and hope, on the one hand, and 
anguish and despair, on the other, to the enjoyment of a bliss and peace that 
would otherwise be inconceivable and inaccessible for us and that traditionally 
is known as union with God, or a sharing in divine glory. Human beings, 
however, possess an almost miraculous gift for changing wine into water, to 
adapt an expression of Kierkegaard’s,3 and for converting blessings into curses. 
The miraculous power in question that Kierkegaard alludes to is certainly much 
older than ‘our age’. Even in the early Christian centuries, at any rate in the 
West, the gift of grace was soon converted into a battleground for theologians.4
 
 But today, nearly five hundred years after the Reformation, there are 
many indications that modern man has rather lost interest in the question of 
grace. The situation, however, remains complex and even confused; the signs of 
the times are not easy to read. A work, for instance, offering a synthesis of the 
trends in twentieth-century theology,5 published in 1966, contains in its index 
only one reference to the doctrine of grace. A quarter of a century later, in a 
short booklet on the ‘New Age’ phenomenon, Cardinal Danneels of Brussels 
wrote: ‘Today, the doctrine of grace is without doubt the most neglected concept 
in theology and in practical Christian life.’6 From a slightly different quarter, 
Gerd Theissen observed in a book published in 1978, that in modern times there 
was genuine interest in the Western religious heritage, but little enthusiasm for 
3 Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, tr. Alastair Hannay (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1985), 67: ‘[O]ur age does not stop with faith, with its miracle of turning water 
into wine; it goes further, it turns wine into water.’ 
4 This well-known story does not have to be retold here in any great detail. Suffice it to 
say that, towards the end of the fourth century, the first serious quarrels on the doctrine 
of grace began when Augustine came to grips with the Pelagian interpretation of grace. 
Augustine rejected Pelagius’ views on grace and pursued his disagreement with the 
Pelagians relentlessly until his death. In one form or another this dispute has continued 
right down to the present day, but it was particularly intense at the time of the 
Reformation in the sixteenth century. Indeed, the Reformation could be seen, 
theologically at any rate, as a renewed triumph of one understanding of Augustine (not 
for nothing was Martin Luther an Augustinian friar) over what was perceived as a 
Pelagian interpretation, or rather falsification, of Christianity. 
5 Hans Jürgen Schultz, Tendenzen der Theologie im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert. Eine 
Geschichte in Porträts (Stuttgart & Olten: Kreuz Verlag & Walter Verlag, 1966). 
6 Godfried Cardinal Danneels, Christ or Aquarius? Exploring the New Age Movement 
(Dublin: Veritas Publications, 1992 [first French ed., 1991]), 39. 
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receiving this heritage as a gift or a ‘grace’; people wished rather to appropriate 
it by their own efforts and use it for their own purposes.7
 
 Endorsing Theissen’s observations are certain remarks by Gisbert 
Greshake, highlighting the contrast between the pre-modern world, in which the 
theological terminology of the Christian West was largely forged, and the 
democratic age, in which we now live. In former times monarchs reigned, for 
example, according to the hallowed formula, ‘by the grace of God’. They thus 
received the legitimation of their power ‘from above’, and – understood as 
God’s representatives on earth8 – were expected to show towards their subjects 
the grace and goodness associated with the divine order of things. Nowadays, 
our political leaders receive their legitimation, in theory at least, ‘from below’, 
that is to say, from the people. As for ‘the people’, they do not seek favours 
from any government or any state, but rather demand their rights. ‘Today’, 
writes Greshake, ‘no one wants to receive anything as a gift, no one wants to 
live by the grace of another.’9 If such reflections of the contemporary mood are 
taken seriously, then the question inevitably must be asked: ‘What is the point, 
at the present time, of continuing to use an apparently obsolete theological 
vocabulary that seems to belong to a world that has had its day?’ 
 
 On the other hand, however, one can also find in modern theology 
contrary indications to this general impression of unconcern with, or even 
antipathy towards, traditional expressions of Christian faith. For, although in 
both the first edition of his book,10 which appeared in 1977, and in the second 
edition of 1992, Greshake noted the lack of sustained theological reflection on 
the question of grace, despite its undisputed significance for Christian living, 
and stressed its seeming lack of contemporary existential relevance,11 
7 G. Theissen, On Having a Critical Faith, tr. John Bowden (London: SCM, 1979), 21–
23. Theissen’s remarks are in no sense, of course, to be taken as a crude polemic against 
‘modern consciousness’. 
8 Although the idea of the divine right of kings was to become well entrenched in the 
culture of the Christian West, its origins are of course much older. 
9 G. Greshake, Geschenkte Freiheit: Einführung in die Gnadenlehre 
(Freiburg/Basel/Wien: Herder, 1992 [new ed.]), 11. See also, on the same topic, 
Johannes Auer, Kleine katholische Dogmatik, vol. 5: ‘Das Evangelium der Gnade’ 
(Regensburg: Pustet, 1970), 19: ‘What [man] is to become and what is to become of his 
world, is something he himself wants to achieve, not something he wants to owe to 
anyone else.’ 
10 Greshake, Geschenkte Freiheit, 5. 
11 Op. cit., 7. 
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nevertheless, the same author also drew attention, in 1992, to ‘a veritable deluge 
of publications’12 on the doctrine of grace that had appeared in the previous 
twenty years. Such conflicting evidence suggests that the doctrine of grace is, 
and will remain, difficult to pin down, even though it no doubt will also 
continue to provoke a multiplicity of interpretations without yielding any 
uniquely definitive or systematic understanding of its ultimate object. 
 
 In dealing with the doctrine of grace, however, it can be stated with 
relative confidence that one is dealing with the whole Christian economy. In 
Bernanos’s well-known phrase, which – on his own admission – he borrowed 
from St Thérèse of Lisieux: ‘Everything is grace.’13 That in itself is one good 
reason why it is so difficult to discuss this doctrine. But there are many others. 
For, in order to treat the question of grace adequately, it would be necessary to 
speak about both God Himself and about every aspect of his – to use Hans Urs 
von Balthasar’s term – ‘theodramatic’ plan. That is to say, one would have to 
speak about creation, sin, the redemption won for us by Jesus Christ, the life of 
the Church, and the eschatological consummation of the divine plan for the 
world.14 ‘Grace’, therefore, as Cornelius Ernst noted,15 is not simply the name 
given to one of God’s gifts to us. More precisely, the term ‘grace’ refers to the 
totality of God’s self-communication to us.16
 
 Since grace does not then refer only to a single aspect, but rather to the 
whole of the Christian reality, it is not surprising to see that the subject has been 
treated in a variety of ways in the history of theology. Peter Lombard (ca1095–
1160), for example, discusses the question of grace in the context of the 
doctrines of God, creation, redemption, and the sacraments. Thomas Aquinas 
(ca1224–1274), a century later, deals with questions on grace in his discussion 
of the Christian moral life (STh, Ia, IIae, qq. 109–114). Bonaventure (1217–
1274), for his part, was the first theologian to begin to envisage the doctrine of 
grace as a doctrine to be dealt with in its own right, when he wrote a specific 
12 Ibid. 
13 G. Bernanos, Journal d’un Curé de Campagne, in Œuvres Romanesques (Paris: 
Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1961), 1259 (cf. p. 1851). 
14 See J. Auer, Kleine katholische Dogmatik, vol. 5, 16. 
15 Cornelius Ernst, O.P., The Theology of Grace (Theology Today Series, No. 17; Cork: 
Mercier Press, 1974), 29, 92. 
16 ‘It is not as though we were to itemize God’s gifts and call one of them “grace”; it is 
rather that “grace” qualifies the whole of God’s self-communication as a gift beyond all 
telling’ (C. Ernst, op. cit., 29). 
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treatise on grace (‘On the Grace of the Holy Spirit’), situating it between his 
treatment of Christ and his treatment of the sacraments (Breviloquium V).17 In 
the revivified Scholasticism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the 
Spanish Jesuit thinker Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) became the first 
theologian to devote an entire, detailed treatise to the question of grace (de 
gratia). As Georg Kraus points out, this work was to provide the fundamental 
structure of subsequent Catholic treatises on grace right down to recent times.18 
It is interesting to note that the new Catechism of the Catholic Church deals 
with the subject of grace above all in the part devoted to moral theology, i.e. 
Part Three (entitled: ‘Life in Christ’)—that is to say, within the context of the 
practical realisation of the Christian vocation in the life of the faithful. 
 
 
The post-medieval historical background19
 
 
 It was during the sixteenth century, the century of the Reformation, that 
the Catholic interpretation of the doctrine of grace began to be dominated by the 
problematic of ‘nature’ and ‘grace’,20 i.e. by the question of how precisely 
nature and grace were interconnected. In referring to ‘nature’ in this context, 
what Catholic theology had in mind was ‘pure nature’ (natura pura), so-called. 
Such terms became significant in discussions of grace, as the Catholic Church 
sought to avoid the exaggerated optimism associated with the humanist, neo-
Pelagian spirit of the Renaissance, on the one hand, and to reject equally the 
extreme pessimism of the Reformers regarding the human condition, on the 
other. In attempting to manœuvre between these two possibilities, Catholic 
theology endeavoured to maintain, as against any ‘total depravity’ view of the 
17 See Georg Kraus, ‘Gnadenlehre’, Lexikon der katholischen Dogmatik, ed. Wolfgang 
Beinert (Leipzig: St. Benno-Verlag, 1989 [originally published by Herder, Freiburg im 
Breisgau, 1987]), 209. 
18 Ibid. 
19 On the history of the theology of grace since the Reformation, see Henri Rondet, The 
Grace of Christ (New York, 1967), 275-384; Piet Fransen, ‘Dogmengeschichtliche 
Entfaltung der Gnadenlehre’, Mysterium Salutis (Einsiedeln/Zürich/Cologne, 1973), 
vol. IV/2, 693-765; José Martin-Palma, ‘Gnadenlehre von der Reformation bis zur 
Gegenwart’, Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte, vol. III, 5b (Freiburg/Basel/Wien, 
1980); Greshake, Geschenkte Freiheit (1992), 73-142. 
20 See Henri de Lubac, Surnaturel (Paris: Aubier, 1946); Edward Yarnold, The Second 
Gift: A Study of Grace (Slough: St Paul Publications, 1974), 26-41. 
 6
                                          
human condition, the intrinsic value of created human nature, even when 
deprived of grace, while agreeing with the Reformers, and indeed the general 
Christian tradition, that human salvation depended wholly on the gratuitous gift 
of divine grace and was not something that could be attained or merited by 
human effort alone. In order to safeguard what were judged to be fundamental 
truths of the Christian faith that the Reformers were perceived as disregarding or 
rejecting (namely, the inherent value of even fallen human nature), Catholic 
thinkers were almost forced into overemphasising the fateful distinction drawn 
by the Counter-Reformation between ‘nature’ and ‘grace’. And this distinction 
proved subsequently to be the basis of an unhelpful interpretation of the human 
condition in relation to God that was to thrive in Catholic theology over the 
following centuries. For it was an interpretation that presupposed a ‘two-storey’ 
or ‘two-tier’ view of reality, one in which, theoretically, human nature could 
exist in a ‘pure’ state, unconnected with God, and seek a ‘natural’ fulfilment, or 
alternatively could seek fulfilment at a ‘supernatural’ level by accepting the gift 
of divine grace. According to some commentators,21 it was – allegedly – a 
misinterpretation of Thomas Aquinas by Cajetan that first opened up this 
hypothetical way of envisaging the relationship between God and man, while 
others22 have blamed Bellarmine for this momentous, and potentially misleading 
turn taken in the theology of grace. 
 
 From the sixteenth century onwards, then, to put the matter in more 
concrete terms, Catholic theology was to become excessively preoccupied with 
the question of ‘actual’ (or ‘created’23) grace, to the detriment of reflection on 
21 For example, Yarnold, op. cit., 33ff., who follows de Lubac on this question. 
22 For example, Herman-Emiel Mertens, ‘Nature and Grace in Twentieth-Century Catholic 
Theology’, in Louvain Studies, 16 (1991), 244, who, for his part, is guided by H. Rondet 
and P. Schmulders. 
23 Cf. Piet Fransen, The New Life of Grace (London, 1971), 94f. It is worth noting, in 
passing, that at the origin of the concept of ‘created grace’ seems to lie, according to 
Wolfhart Pannenberg, the idea of the immutability of God. If God’s attitude to man – in 
so far as man is a sinner – is to change, so the argument runs, that can only come about 
if there is a change in man, since God cannot change. For the scholastic theologians, the 
human soul had to be modified by created grace in order for the immutable God to be 
able to enter into a new relation with it. In a similar way, Descartes believed that God 
could not intervene in the world, since such an intervention would be incompatible with 
God’s immutability. All the changes that occurred in the world had, therefore, to be 
explained by physical causes internal to the system of the world itself. See Pannenberg, 
Systematische Theologie, vol. 1 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), 472. 
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what was termed ‘uncreated’24 grace or the idea of the divinisation of man, an 
idea that has always been for the Orthodox Church of supreme importance.25 In 
other words, Catholic theology became bogged down in trying to anatomise the 
effects of God’s grace in human life, while neglecting more fundamental and 
weightier theological and existential issues highlighted by older theologies of 
grace, above all by that of Augustine himself. The overall impression, indeed, 
given by the Catholic theology of grace after Trent is of an inability to see the 
wood for the trees. Faced with both the specific threat posed by the Reformers, 
and the pervasive challenge of the modern world, Catholic thinkers and 
theologians – if one excepts the rare figure of a Pascal – went on the defensive, 
and did not feel free, or called upon, to examine their Christian faith in new 
ways or in the light of new circumstances. What they did feel called upon to do, 
first and foremost, was to defend the Catholic faith against all errors and 
assaults; any other approach would, no doubt, have seemed tantamount to 
indulging in an irresponsible luxury. And errors were feared not merely if they 
came from outside the fold, but even – and perhaps especially – if they came 
from within the fold, as the continuing, acrimonious quarrels and disputes on 
grace within the Catholic Church itself at this time amply demonstrate. For in 
this period rival Jesuit and Dominican theologians continued to pursue 
relentlessly, in the de Auxiliis quarrel, as it was called, their mutually 
antagonistic and finally inconclusive reflections on the theology of grace, above 
all on the question of how precisely divine grace and human free will might be 
related.26 No general consensus, however, in favour of either side in the dispute, 
was ever reached within Catholicism on this most intractable of questions.27
 
 
The cultural context of Counter-Reformation Catholic theology 
24 See Greshake, op. cit., 81f., especially the following assessment: ‘Against the 
Reformers, Trent had asserted in a polemical, one-sided manner that God’s personal 
divine mercy towards man (uncreated grace) has an effect on man (created grace); this 
now became the main defining characteristic of the doctrine of grace’ (p. 81). 
25 For a discussion of the typical viewpoints on the question of grace that are to be found 
in Orthodoxy, Catholicism, and Protestantism, see ‘Appendix III: Grace and Nature in 
East and West’, in E.L. Mascall, The Openness of Being (London, 1971), 217–250. 
26 See Greshake, op. cit., 85–88. 
27 The ‘Congregatio de Auxiliis’, a commission set up to investigate the matter, was 
disbanded, somewhat inconclusively, in 1607. Pope Paul V’s last word on the matter at 
the time was that the Dominicans should not be regarded as Calvinists nor the Jesuits as 
Pelagians. 
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 In considering the development of the Catholic theology of grace since 
the beginning of modern times, it should not be forgotten that the humanism of 
the age of the Renaissance (which was, of course, also the age of the 
Reformation), and, even more so, the rationalism of the age of Reason, both 
gave new life to a deeply-ingrained, if often contested, dualism in the cultural 
life of the West. Mainly in an effort to find common ground on which 
intractable political, social, and legal problems could be tackled, the post-
Reformation world, no doubt unwittingly, deepened the fundamental division 
between the properly human domain (‘nature’) and that of the divine 
(‘supernature’). By seeking in contentious areas common ground based on 
reason, post-Reformation thinkers hoped to circumvent the cultural pressures 
exercised by specific religious allegiances. Trent had already emphasised the 
division between the human and the divine, for its own theological reasons, 
namely in order to rescue the idea of the underlying goodness of created human 
nature – even without grace – from the Reformers’ pessimistic vision of 
humanity’s total corruption, while for the Reformers themselves the dichotomy 
between God and man was characteristically conveyed by the existentially vital 
experience of total human fallenness and corruption when confronted with the 
utter holiness of the divine. Thus from different perspectives, both Reformers 
and Catholics reinforced the distinction between God and man. What was new 
about the modern, ‘rationalist’ approach to human life, was that it left the 
‘divine’ half of the traditional dichotomy to fend for itself, and concentrated 
only on the ‘human’ side of things, whereas both the Reformers and Counter-
Reformers tried, in their diverse ways, to find a way of relating the two sides to 
each other. 
 
 In the new, ‘rationalist’ approach to reality, Descartes was, 
philosophically speaking, the great initiator, but the tendency to organise life 
rationally made itself felt also, of course, in the political, social, and legal 
spheres. After the Reformation, an attempt was made to organise human life on 
earth in a religiously ‘neutral’ way or, in the celebrated phrase of the Dutch 
jurist and theologian, Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), etsi Deus non daretur (‘as if 
God did not exist’). What was perhaps not too clearly foreseen in this new 
departure, was the enormous influence that the strict division between the two 
orders, the natural and the supernatural, would exercise subsequently on the 
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progress of Deism in Europe. Even among the religiously committed, this 
division made an ominous and unmistakable impression on the way the 
Christian faith itself was construed. For it encouraged two essentially distinct 
approaches to religion, on the one hand, a rationalist, and on the other, a pietist 
or fideist attitude, thus neglecting the older Christian insistence28 on seeing a 
necessary, not an arbitrary or voluntary, connection between faith and reflection, 
while avoiding the trap of identifying the two. In the nineteenth century, the 
First Vatican Council itself formally endorsed the difference between natural 
knowledge of God, and supernatural faith, thus giving an old and valuable 
distinction in Catholic theology (between faith and understanding) a modern 
expression, coloured perhaps more by the exigencies of the nineteenth-century 
debate between religion and rationalistic or ‘scientific’ materialism, than by the 
exigencies of Christianity itself. 
 
 As regards the defence of religion in the post-Reformation world, 
Christian thinkers, in general, attempted – somewhat too vigorously, it might be 
argued – to combat rationalist adversaries of the Christian faith on the 
battleground the latter had chosen, the ground of pure reason,29 and in choosing 
to do so failed to realise that they thereby risked losing sight of the richness and 
subtlety of the Christian tradition itself. In short, what was specific to the 
Christian tradition tended to remain hidden in a kind of cultural ghetto, instead 
of being put, like the lamp in the parable, ‘on a stand, that those who enter may 
see the light’ (Lk 8: 16). Yet, at the same time, from a Catholic perspective it 
might be argued, somewhat perversely perhaps, that a possible advantage of the 
quasi-rationalistic idea of ‘pure nature’ is that it could subvert the kind of 
suspicion that was to be voiced most famously by Feuerbach in the nineteenth 
century, namely that grace is only an illusion or fantasy created by human need. 
For, according to the theory of ‘pure nature’, man could in principle live by a 
natural morality, reflect with the aid of purely natural reason, and seek an 
entirely natural happiness, without necessarily having to concern himself at all 
with divine grace. But an argument of this kind is surely implausible. The 
28 As found for example, to name perhaps the best-known instance, in Anselm’s ‘fides 
quaerens intellectum’ [faith seeking understanding], or much further back, in 
Augustine’s dictum: ‘Fides, si non cogitatur, nulla est’ [faith, if not reflected on, is not 
faith] (De Praedestinatione Sanctorum 2, 5 (PL 44, 963), quoted in the encyclical Fides 
et Ratio, #79). 
29 A significant manifestation of this attitude was Kant’s Religion Within the Limits of 
Reason Alone (1793). 
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apologetic advantage lying, allegedly, in the hypothetical notion of ‘pure nature’ 
is merely notional. Hence the price (adopting an existentially irrelevant view of 
the human condition) to be paid for exploiting it in order to refute the suspicions 
of a Feuerbach, is clearly too high. 
 
 Those who appealed to the theory of ‘pure nature’ wished to safeguard, as 
has been indicated, the fundamental value of human nature itself. But they also 
wanted to highlight the gratuitous and transcendent nature – in short, the divine 
nature – of God’s grace, and to stress, consequently, that human beings had no 
purely ‘natural’ claim on grace, nor could they earn grace by their own efforts. 
All of these assertions were unobjectionable. But the difficulty with the theory 
was that the ‘purely natural’ man it envisaged only existed as an intellectual 
construct or abstraction, not in reality, as Maurice Blondel30 and other modern 
Catholic thinkers were later at pains to point out. It was thus unhelpful to have 
created the impression that for Christianity ‘natural man’ was anything other 
than the real, concrete human being of whom the classical theologians of the 
Western Catholic tradition had always spoken. Both Augustine and Thomas 
Aquinas,31 for example, expressed, albeit with differences of emphasis,32 the 
30 Blondel spoke of ‘the state of “pure nature” . . . which undoubtedly could have existed, 
but does not exist, and never has existed; we cannot even define precisely the actual 
conditions under which it might exist’ (‘La Semaine Sociale de Bordeaux’, in Annales 
de Philosophie Chrétienne, Dec., 1939, 268; quoted by Stephen J. Duffy, The Graced 
Horizon: Nature and Grace in Modern Catholic Thought (Collegeville, MN: The 
Liturgical Press, 1992), 108f.). 
31 For Thomas’s position on this question, see Greshake, op. cit., 64; J.A. Di Noia in 
David F. Ford (ed.), The Modern Theologians: An introduction to Christian theology in 
the twentieth century, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 125f.; see also Pannenberg, 
Systematische Theologie, vol. 2 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991), 251 
(‘The doctrine of the image of God was set forth by him [Thomas] as an answer to the 
question of the purpose of the creation of man’). 
32 Speaking about the respective positions of Augustine and Aquinas on the question of 
the relation between nature and grace, de Lubac writes in A Brief Catechesis on Nature 
and Grace, tr. Bro. Richard Arnandez, F.S.C. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1984), 
122f.: ‘We might merely observe that the most usual difference between them, an 
essential difference but not a contradiction, arises because St. Thomas frequently begins 
by considering human nature as such in the abstract, independent of sin and its 
consequences; whereas St. Augustine takes as his starting point the experience of sinful 
man. While fully recognizing the transcendence of the supernatural, St. Thomas (giving 
perhaps a somewhat too facile interpretation of the fecisti nos ad Te of St. Augustine) 
“considers it as a completion bestowed on nature in the direction towards which its 
active inclinations already tended”’ (the last quotation is from Guy de Broglie, S.J., 
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traditional view that man had been created by God and created for God, and that 
in Jesus Christ God had gratuitously offered man the gift of participating in his 
own divine life. Yet, even though the idea of ‘pure nature’ turned out to be more 
of a hindrance than a help in elucidating the doctrine of grace, it would be 
unwise to dismiss along with the idea of ‘pure nature’ the related idea of ‘human 
nature’, for, as we shall later have occasion to stress,33 the concept of ‘human 
nature’, unlike that of ‘pure nature’, is by no means existentially vacuous. 
 
 
The Enlightenment and Romanticism34
 
 
 The most significant watershed in the history of the doctrine of grace 
since the end of the Middle Ages, did not occur, as one might be inclined to 
think, with the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century, even though the 
theme of grace was of course of paramount importance for both the Reformers 
and their Catholic counterparts. Even less so did this watershed occur with the 
inner-Catholic disputes on grace that followed the Reformation. Rather, the 
most decisive break in the history of the doctrine of grace, and perhaps even in 
the history of the entire Christian tradition, was that accomplished by the 
Enlightenment and by the reaction to the Enlightenment that the romantic 
movement represented. ‘The Enlightenment’ and ‘Romanticism’ are notoriously 
fluid terms that cannot be easily pinned down. But as starting points for further 
discussion, they are still irreplaceable. 
 
 The age of the Enlightenment, often characterised as anti-Christian, was 
in no sense, however, an irreligious age. Far from wanting to rid the world of 
religion, the Enlightenment was obsessed by it. The majority of Enlightenment 
thinkers wished to retain, not abolish, religion, but religion, for them, had to be 
of ‘natural’, not ‘supernatural’ or ‘revealed’, origin. Christianity’s special claim 
to a revealed truth was what the Enlightenment specifically rejected in the 
religious sphere, just as it called into question all claims to truth based on 
external authority or on the mere facticity or ‘positivity’ of a particular historical 
‘Autour de la notion thomiste de la béatitude’, in Archives de philosophie, 3 (1925), 
222). 
33 In the forthcoming second part of this study. 
34 See M. Henry, ‘The Enlightenment and Romanticism from a Theological Perspective’, 
ITQ, 63 (1998), 250–262. 
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tradition. For the Enlightenment – to this extent, the heir of the Reformation – 
the judgement of the intellectual and moral conscience of the individual was 
supreme in matters of religion. And human reason, presumed to be everywhere 
the same, was considered to be the only sound basis on which judgements about 
truth could be made. What was not self-evident to reason, was suspect, and 
deemed to be mere opinion or prejudice. The clash between truth and commonly 
accepted opinion is, of course, much older than the Enlightenment itself. But in 
the Enlightenment’s debate with Christianity, the resolution of the ancient 
conflict between truth and opinion (or tradition) led to a temporary exaltation of 
Deism, as a rational ‘natural’ version of religion that was in principle accessible 
to all (though in practice reserved to the few). It also led, among large sections 
of the West’s intellectual élite, to a much longer-lasting rejection of, indeed 
almost an instinctive scepticism about, Christian claims to truth. For the 
Enlightenment could not accept a God who, Christianity claimed, sought to 
redeem suffering humanity by means of a divine sacrifice. Such a God was 
perceived as not acting according to the dictates of an enlightened, calculating 
rationalism, since He was believed rather to have acted out of an unfathomable, 
inscrutable, and gratuitous love for mankind. Enlightenment thinkers could not 
accept that ‘morality which has at its head a crucified God’,35 in Pascal’s words. 
Not surprisingly, Pascal – who had himself been, it is worth remembering, 
deeply involved in the disputes on grace in his own time – did not find favour 
with the Enlightenment, whose archetypical spokesman, Voltaire, characterised 
him with exquisite sarcasm as ‘that sublime misanthrope’.36
 
 Yet Deism, the religion of the Aufklärung, did not succeed in replacing 
Christianity as a widespread religious movement. Deism was too abstract – its 
deity too far removed from the cares and anxieties of most mortals – for it to 
triumph on a large scale. What Goethe saw in Christianity, when he noted in 
Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre that it revealed to mankind ‘the divine depths of 
suffering’,37 was a vital aspect of religion for which Deism had no serious 
35 Blaise Pascal, Pensées, §964, tr. A.J. Krailsheimer (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1983), 340; my attention was drawn to this passage by John Campbell, ‘The God of 
Athalie’, French Studies, 43/4 (1989), 401. 
36 Voltaire, Lettres Philosophiques, rev. ed. F.A. Taylor (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965), 94 
[Lettre XXV: Sur les Pensées de M. Pascal]. 
37 Quoted in Karl Löwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche, tr. David E. Green (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991), 23. In a similar vein, Oscar Wilde wrote that, 
‘suffering is the most real mode of life, and the one for which we are all ultimately 
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substitute. According to the expression of Pascal, Deism was ‘almost as remote 
from the Christian religion as atheism, its complete opposite’.38 A deity that was 
only immanent in the world as the general laws of matter or the allegedly 
universal moral law, a deity so remote as to be beyond the experience of the 
majority of human beings, was a deity that could be dispensed with, as having 
no direct or intimate connection with human existence in the world. 
 
 The reaction (if the term is not too feeble) to the Enlightenment was 
Romanticism, and it was among Protestant thinkers that the new current of 
thought and sensibility first made a potent impact in philosophy and theology. 
The key names to be mentioned here are those of the most prominent German 
post-Kantian idealist philosophers, Fichte, Schelling, and especially Hegel, and 
the theologian, Schleiermacher, all of whom created new ways of interpreting 
human experience that have continued to mark Western intellectual life down to 
the present day. These recent and most influential ‘footnotes to Plato’ have been 
assessed since their own times in markedly disparate ways, but their significance 
is not in dispute. The first important Catholic response to the new ideas was 
made in the first half of the nineteenth century by the short-lived Catholic 
Tübingen School,39 which endeavoured to re-express the truths of the Catholic 
faith in the light of the changed cultural context of the times. 
 
 The story of intellectual developments in the West in the last two hundred 
and fifty years is well known, and has only been briefly evoked at this point, to 
provide a general framework for the problematic that here concerns us. For 
contemporary Catholic thinking on grace can perhaps best be understood as the 
continuation of the first steps taken by those nineteenth-century theologians who 
sought to re-express traditional Christian truths in a modern idiom, with all the 
pitfalls such a hazardous enterprise must always involve. And what modern 
Catholic thinkers have been striving to accomplish, has been to hold together the 
two sides of any traditional, Catholic understanding of grace: that is to say, to 
find ways of understanding how grace – which is God’s own life – and human 
created’ (in a letter to Laurence Housman of February/March 1898, in More Letters of 
Oscar Wilde, ed. Rupert Hart-Davis (Oxford, 1987), 167). 
38 Pensées, §449, 168. 
39 See J.P. Geiselmann, Die Katholische Tübinger Schule (Freiburg, Basel, Wien: Herder, 
1964); T.F. O’Meara, Romantic Idealism and Roman Catholicism: Schelling and the 
Theologians (Notre-Dame & London: University of Notre-Dame Press, 1982). 
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history can both co-exist and be interconnected without, however, being 
confused or identified with each other. 
 
 
The development of atheistic humanism 
 
 
 The plight of Christian theology became increasingly dramatic as the 
nineteenth century progressed.40 Two significant milestones along the way were 
the appearance of Strauss’s Life of Jesus (1835/36), which planted in the public 
consciousness the seeds of the suspicion that the Gospels were ‘only’ myth, 
rather than truth, and Jesus ‘only’ a religiously gifted human being, but not the 
incarnate Son of God, and shortly afterwards the publication of Feuerbach’s 
Essence of Christianity (1841), which attributed the very existence of God to the 
workings of the frustrated human imagination. To borrow a phrase from Peter 
Gay, at this time the ‘road from Damascus’ became at least as frequently 
travelled as the ‘road to Damascus’.41 In Henri de Lubac’s expression, the 
nineteenth century witnessed the unfolding of ‘the drama of atheistic 
humanism’, embryonically in the influence of the works of the period just 
mentioned, and fully fledged in the writings of thinkers like Marx, Nietzsche, 
and somewhat later, Freud. In this drama, the desire for liberation – which will 
become, by a curious irony, one of the principal themes of the doctrine of grace 
in the twentieth century – is expressed in a rejection of God. Christianity itself 
came to be regarded, and then repudiated, as a force for enslavement and 
exploitation, the dialectical opposite of its own traditional self-understanding as 
the religion of redemption and liberation. Thus, the young Rimbaud (1854–
1891) could write at the end of the poem, ‘Les Premières Communions’: 
 
Christ! ô Christ, éternel voleur des énergies, 
Dieu qui pour deux mille ans vouas à ta pâleur, 
Cloués au sol, de honte et de céphalalgies, 
40 The difficulties experienced by religious thinkers in that period help to explain, for 
instance, why a Thomas Merton should have alluded to ‘the embattled inferiority 
complex of much nineteenth-century thought’ (The Literary Essays of Thomas Merton, 
ed. Bro. Patrick Hart (New York: New Directions Publishing Corporation, 1985), 93). 
41 P. Gay, The Naked Heart. The Bourgeois Experience: Victoria to Freud, vol. iv (New 
York/London, W.W. Norton & Co., 1995), 124. 
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Ou renversés, les fronts des femmes de douleur.42
 
Other influential forms adopted by the nineteenth-century disowning of 
Christianity included seeing it as mere cowardice in the face of worldly 
existence, regarded as the sole reality definitely available to human beings, or 
even judging it as an expression of hatred for ‘natural’ life. In Nietzsche’s view, 
the God of Christianity was the ‘antithesis’ of ‘natural’ life, and so, for him, 
Christianity was the great enemy to be overcome in the defence of ‘life’.43
 
 At the same time, in the course of the nineteenth century, a rationalist and 
allegedly scientific positivism, associated with Auguste Comte, the founder of 
modern sociology (his term), became a dominant intellectual fashion.44 And 
42 Prose translation in A. Rimbaud, Collected Poems, tr. Oliver Bernard (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1969), 152: ‘Christ! O Christ! eternal thief of vigour! God who for two 
thousand years hast dedicated to Thy pallor the brows of sorrowful women, nailed to the 
earth in shame and in headaches – or overthrown completely.’ 
43 Cf. The Anti-Christ § 15, tr. R.J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1990), 
135: ‘In Christianity neither morality nor religion comes into contact with reality at any 
point. Nothing but imaginary causes (“God”, “soul”, “ego”, “spirit”, “free will” – or 
“unfree will”): nothing but imaginary effects (“sin”, “redemption”, “grace”, 
“punishment”, “forgiveness of sins”). . . . Once the concept “nature” had been devised 
as the concept antithetical to “God”, “natural” had to be the word for “reprehensible” – 
this entire fictional world has its roots in hatred of the natural (– actuality! –), it is the 
expression of a profound discontent with the actual. . . .’ See also the conclusion of On 
the Genealogy of Morals (III, 28), in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, tr. and ed. W. 
Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library, 1968), 598f.: ‘. . . this longing to get away 
from all appearance, change, becoming, death, wishing, from longing itself—all this 
means—let us dare to grasp it—a will to nothingness, an aversion to life, a rebellion 
against the most fundamental presuppositions of life . . . ’ See, finally, the remarks of 
Henri de Lubac on the modern view of God as a threat to human freedom and creativity, 
in Le Drame de l’humanisme athée (Paris: Éditions Spes, 1959), 20-22. 
44 There were, of course, exceptions to the general rule. The French writer Paul Claudel 
(1868–1955), for example, writing in his Ma conversion, ironically about the influence 
of Rimbaud, notes: ‘The reading of the Illuminations, and then, a few months later, of 
Une saison en enfer, was for me a major event. For the first time, these books opened 
up a crack in my materialist prison and gave me the living and almost physical sensation 
of the supernatural.’ And in a letter to Jacques Rivière, written in 1908, he repeats: 
‘Rimbaud was the major influence on me . . . I shall always remember that June 
morning in 1886 when I bought that little issue of La Vogue which contained the start of 
the Illuminations. It really was an illumination for me. I was finally emerging from that 
hideous world of Taine, Renan and the other Molochs of the nineteenth century, from 
that awful mechanistic system governed entirely by laws that were absolutely rigid and 
– the ultimate horror – knowable and teachable . . . For me it was the revelation of the 
supernatural’ (quoted by Charles Du Bos, Approximations (Paris: Fayard, 1965), 1203). 
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coming from the direction of the natural sciences, the pervasive influence of 
Darwin proved inescapable. His Origin of Species (1859) implicitly questioned 
the Christian doctrine of creation and especially the belief in the special status of 
humanity as made in the image of God. From the time of its publication, the 
conjecture gained ground that human life was merely one example – among a 
profusion of others – of natural life on earth, and that any transcendent or 
supernatural realm, of which religion spoke, was pure illusion. In The Gay 
Science (1882), with Darwin’s thought no doubt in mind, Nietzsche advocated 
the need to ‘de-divinise’ nature, and then to ‘naturalise’ man, in the sense of 
demonstrating man’s exclusively ‘natural’ nature, and the folly, dishonesty, and 
wastefulness of believing in any transcendent or supernatural destiny for the 
human race.45 In his paradoxical, provocative way, Nietzsche uses Christian 
terminology in the very act of subverting its meaning: for him, the world 
becomes man’s place of redemption when man is finally shorn – as for 
Nietzsche the ‘rest of nature’ already is – of any pretensions to a supernatural 
origin or destiny. But yet, even for Nietzsche redemption is still what the world, 
and man, are in need of, albeit not in the sense envisaged by Christianity.46 
Interestingly, but not altogether surprisingly, given that they were 
contemporaries, the antithesis between Christianity and ‘naturalism’ that 
Nietzsche dramatised, raising it to a pitch of paroxysm, is also reflected in the 
much more restrained writings of another anguished critic, J.H. Newman. After 
45 The Gay Science, Bk. 3, §109, tr. W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 
169: ‘When will we complete our de-deification of nature? When may we begin to 
“naturalize” humanity in terms of a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature?’ 
Kaufmann comments on this passage (ibid.): ‘“Naturalize” is here used in the sense of 
naturalism, as opposed to supernaturalism. Man is to be reintegrated into nature.’ See 
also Beyond Good and Evil, § 230, tr. W. Kaufmann, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, 
351f.: “To translate man back into nature; to become master over the many vain and 
overly enthusiastic interpretations and connotations that have so far been scrawled and 
painted over that eternal basic text of homo natura; to see to it that man henceforth 
stands before man as even today, hardened in the discipline of science, he stands before 
the rest of nature, with intrepid Oedipus eyes and sealed Odysseus ears, deaf to the siren 
songs of old metaphysical bird catchers who have been piping at him all too long, “you 
are more, you are higher, you are of a different origin!”—that may be a strange and 
insane task, but it is a task—who would deny that?’ 
46 See Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Pt. II, tr. R.J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1986), 161: 
  ‘And how could I endure to be a man, if man were not also poet and reader of riddles 
and the redeemer of chance! 
  To redeem the past and to transform every “It was” into an “I wanted it thus!” – that 
alone do I call redemption!’ 
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his conversion to the Catholic Church, Newman claimed that, faced with the 
religious problems of the age, the only real choice—at least for those, 
presumably, like himself who felt such problems acutely—lay between what he 
called ‘Catholicity’ and atheism.47
 
 
The Church’s reaction 
 
 
 The initial steps taken by nineteenth-
century Catholic theologians in seeking answers to the questions raised for 
Christianity by the intellectual realities of the modern world were interrupted 
towards the end of the century by the publication of Leo XIII’s encyclical 
Aeterni Patris (1879), which promoted neo-Scholasticism or, as it was also 
called, neo-Thomism in Catholic centres of higher learning. It was hoped that a 
renewal of Thomist philosophy would be the key to fending off the assaults of 
modern culture. Neo-Thomism, however, which may in fact have retained little, 
if any, of the spirit of real Thomism,48 proved unable to hold back the flood of 
existential questions and anxieties that were spreading with increasing intensity 
not only in the world at large but even within the Church. To modern questions 
and anxieties, neo-Thomism had no convincing or persuasive responses. Like an 
old patch on a new cloak, it seemed simply quaint and irrelevant, and thus 
unlikely to change the direction of modern sensibilities. The description applied 
by George Santayana to the situation of ‘absolute idealism’ in the early part of 
the last century (‘nothing will have been disproved, but everything will have 
47 See, however, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (London: Longman, Green, and 
Co., 1891), ‘Note II’ (pp. 495–501), where Newman explains what he meant by saying 
in his Apologia ‘that there is no medium, in true philosophy, between Atheism and 
Catholicity, and that a perfectly consistent mind, under those circumstances in which it 
finds itself here below must embrace either the one or the other’ (p. 496). Newman was 
clearly nettled by, and sought to refute, the accusation that his defence of Catholicism 
relied ‘upon the threat and the consequent scare, that, unless a man be a Catholic he 
ought to be an Atheist’ (p. 495). 
48 A recent commentator goes so far as to conjecture that, ‘almost certainly the rebel 
Thomas would at a certain time in history—perhaps when Pope Leo XIII inaugurated 
modern Thomism, in 1879—ceased [sic] to have been a Roman Catholic’ (Martin 
Seymour-Smith, The 100 Most Influential Books Ever Written: The History of Thought 
From Ancient Times to Today (New York: Citadel Press, 2001), 143). 
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been abandoned’49) could with little exaggeration have been extended to the 
wider world of Western religion. And a world thus drifting away from its past 
was scarcely going to regain its religious soul by being merely confronted with 
the ghost of traditional thought. 
 
 The next effort that was made, after the attempted revival of Thomism, to 
meet the needs of the times, was undertaken towards the end of the nineteenth 
century by a number of Catholic thinkers who eventually became known 
collectively as the ‘Modernist Movement’. Unlike the earlier Catholic Tübingen 
School, this movement was international in character. And the pressures of 
modern thought were clearly not only more widely, but also more keenly felt in 
the Catholic world at this later time. But the efforts of the modernists, too, were 
nipped in the bud, when the movement was condemned early in the twentieth 
century.50 The modernists’ understanding of Revelation was held to smack of 
immanentism, with divine truth emerging gradually, rather than descending in 
its fullness like a bolt from the blue; their understanding of faith was considered 
too experiential and subjective; and their approach to history was regarded as 
too sceptical, especially regarding the beginnings of Christianity. Such features 
of modernism were thought to undermine belief in Christianity’s supernatural 
origins, and thus to subvert the Church’s claim to be founded on an absolutely 
unique divine Revelation. 
 
 A Catholic intellectual renewal that in due time was to gain lasting, large-
scale approval did, however, finally get under way. Initiated not by theologians, 
but by philosophers such as Joseph Maréchal and, above all, Maurice Blondel,51 
it was subsequently built upon by the historical researches of scholars like de 
49 Winds of Doctrine, 211, quoted by John Macquarrie, Twentieth-Century Religious 
Thought, 4th ed. (London: SCM. 1989), 44. 
50 ‘Modernism’ was officially condemned in 1907 by Pope Pius X in the decree 
Lamentabili and the encyclical Pascendi. See the brief remarks on Catholic modernism 
in M. Henry, On not understanding God (Dublin: Columba, 1997), 222f. 
51 According to Henri de Lubac, himself one of the principal architects of the ‘nouvelle 
théologie’: ‘We must admit that the main impulse for [Latin theology’s return to a more 
authentic tradition] came from a philosopher, Maurice Blondel . . . It was mainly 
because of his influence, as Fr. Henri Bouillard explained, that “we have consciously 
ceased to conceive of the natural and the supernatural orders as though they were two 
superposed storeys without inner connections”’ (H. de Lubac, A Brief Catechesis on 
Nature and Grace, 37f.). On Blondel, see Max Seckler, ‘Maurice Blondel’, in 
Tendenzen der Theologie im 20. Jahrhundert, 74-79 [see note 4]. 
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Lubac52 in the ‘nouvelle théologie’53 movement, and by the efforts of 
theologians like Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan, both of whom had 
originally been trained in neo-Thomism but had recognised the need to 
transcend it. Thanks to such philosophers and theologians, the situation slowly 
began to change, and the efforts expended bore fruit, after certain hesitations 
and difficulties, in the course of the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s. 
 
 Looking back over the last two centuries, could say that in this period 
Catholic theology has struggled to cast off the burdensome legacy of the so-
called ‘extrinsicist’ manner of conceiving the relationship between divine grace 
and the historical reality of human existence, while at the same time striving, in 
most cases, to maintain and to explain—more adequately than the ‘two-storey’ 
description of the relationship managed to do54—the distinction and yet also the 
connection that must exist between God’s gratuitous offer of grace to man, and 
the role that man himself has to play in the working out of his salvation. In other 
words, to use the two terms that have become both traditional and also highly 
problematic in Catholic thought, the last two centuries have witnesssed various 
attempts to express, in the aftermath of the Enlightenment, what is the actual 
relationship that obtains between ‘nature’ and ‘grace’—if, that is to say, they are 
not one and the same. In the second part of this study, we shall look in more 
detail at some significant twentieth-century theological movements and figures 
who have shaped the contemporary Catholic interpretation of grace.55
52 See A. Vanneste, ‘La théologie du surnaturel dans les écrits de Henri de Lubac’, 
Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses, 69 (1993), 273–314. 
53 See José Martin-Palma, Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte, vol. III, 5b, 178–180. 
54 See above, 5ff. (‘The post-medieval historical background’). 
55 The second part of this study is to appear in the next issue of the ITQ. 
